Rivalry between and among the military departments has been an element of the development of the United States military establishment, especially in the post-World War II period. While some may view such rivalries as impediments to the development and maintenance of effective defense capabilities, others argue that organizational rivalries, properly managed, spur the development of innovative solutions to difficult problems. This is consistent with economic theory, which suggests that the existence of multiple buyers spurs innovation as suppliers attempt to gain a competitive advantage through product differentiation.
A. Introduction
Organizational rivalry has been an important facet of the development of the American military establishment, especially from World War II onward. 1 The existence of three separate Services, as well as quasi-independent elements such as the U.S. Marine Corps and the U.S. Special Operations Command, with often overlapping mission responsibilities, establishes fertile ground for competitions over missions and functions. Such competitions are widely viewed as wasteful of resources and impediments to the development of effective military capabilities.
There is, however, another view, that such rivalries, properly managed, provide the impetus for the development of major innovations in military strategy and doctrine, and in the weapon systems necessary to support those strategies and doctrines. This is consistent with economic theory, which suggests that the existence of multiple buyers spurs innovation through a search to differentiate products.
To investigate the impact of rivalry among the elements of the U.S. military on the rate of innovation produced by the defense industrial base, the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA) organized a discussion among a select group of defense experts. The group represented both academicians who have studied the role of rivalry in military organizations and former officials of the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) who have extensive senior level experience in defense management and defense acquisition. The participants were: Mr. James Dominy, Research Staff Member, IDA, contributed a briefing that framed the discussion.
The group convened on November 3, 2010 at IDA to discuss these issues. This paper is a summary of that discussion and of the conclusions arrived at by the group. The narrative attempts to convey the consensus of the group, not that of individual participants. Where opinions differed, that is pointed out without individual attribution.
B. Theories of Military Innovation
A number of researchers have studied the process by which innovation occurs in military organizations in order to better understand these organizational processes. The results of this research can be summarized into three main schools of thought:
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• Innovation is driven by civilian leadership.
• Innovation is the result of internal dynamic processes.
• Innovation is the result of inter-and intra-Service rivalries.
We will discuss each of these theories in turn.
Innovation is Driven by Civilian Leadership
This line of analysis, put forth by Barry Posen, argues that pressures from civilian leadership (within and outside of the military establishment) generate the force necessary to induce change in military organizations. External pressure is required because the attachment to current doctrine and weapons is so strong that the bonds can only be broken by external forces.
The development and accelerated purchase of Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles would be an example of this type of innovation. Civilian leaders pushed the Army acquisition community into making the purchase of such vehicles an absolute priority, in the face of military personnel losses due to improvised explosive devices.
Innovation as a Result of Internal Dynamics
This line of analysis, led by Stephen Rosen, views innovation as resulting from internal dynamics within the Services themselves. Visionary military leaders develop new concepts, recruit like-minded mid-level officers to flesh out tactics and doctrine, and provide the career pathways to senior command levels, thus institutionalizing the change. Dr. Rosen cites the development of air defense radar in Great Britain and carrier aviation by the U.S. Navy prior to World War II as examples of innovation resulting primarily from internal dynamics within the military.
Innovation as a Result of Inter-and Intra-Service Rivalry
This school of thought, led by Owen Cote and Harvey Sapolsky, argues that rivalrous behavior produces alternative methods by which command authorities can achieve a desired end. Rivalries arise because of Service fears about their current and future relevance. These fears spur the Services to develop innovative solutions to maintain a current mission and to attempt to capture a share of any new mission. This sets up a competition between the Services, with each bringing forth alternative solutions to a mission need. These alternative solutions are debated in full view of the leadership, who are then in a position to adjudicate the competition and provide the resources necessary to bring the winning solution(s) to fruition. The competing organizations' "buyers" engage in more experimentation due to the fluidity of buyer preferences. This experimentation offers the potential to craft solutions to different organizational preferences, a solution not possible if there is only one buyer.
Each of these models presumes the existence of external forces, but differs in the process by which an organization reacts to those external forces. Dr. Posen's work is based, in part, on lessons of the United States and Great Britain in the period leading up to World War II, where civilian leaders pushed their military establishments for innovations in armored warfare and fighter aircraft. However, most successful military innovations have antecedents in concepts driven by innovative military leadership. Carrier warfare and ballistic missiles exemplify the role of internal leadership. Dr. Rosen argues that these internal dynamics, once established, are sufficiently strong that they negate the effects of a rapid turnover of military and civilian leadership on the sustainment of innovation. It should be noted, however, that, in the absence of war, there is little effective feedback to advance the process of innovation.
C. Case Studies
To examine these theories in more concrete terms, the group examined two case studies: the development of the Polaris class of ballistic missile submarines, and the development of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs). The case studies were designed to elicit discussion about the patterns of organizational rivalry, and to discuss the impact of rivalry on innovation in weapon systems.
Polaris
The development of the Polaris program 4 demonstrates the role of organizational rivalry in innovation in an environment where all of the Military Services were competing for a share of the new strategic deterrence mission area. The Navy had to organizationally commit to a role in this mission area, and had to develop a solution that differentiated itself from the Air Force and Army solutions, which were already under development. The Chief of Naval Operations envisioned the strategic mission as a key mission for the future of the Navy. The proposed Navy entrant into the mission area, a submarine-fired nuclear missile, required not just the submarines and missiles, but the surface ships, helicopters, and other assets required to protect the submarines and to attack the enemy's force. Winning a share of the deterrence mission area would thereby assure the continued relevance of the Navy in the changing international security environment.
The key to the success of the Navy in the competition was the development of a viable, solid fuel missile of suitable size and performance, to be launched from a submarine; without such a solution, it is unlikely that the Navy could have developed an acceptable system capable of winning a piece of the mission. The Air Force had started working on solid fuel missiles for its future systems. The Navy successfully pushed the industrial base to accelerate this development and the development of related technologies, to create a system that was able to capture a long-term share of the strategic deterrent mission.
The development of the Polaris system not only cemented a long-term mission for the Navy, but resulted in creative destruction, in that its success killed the competing Army missile system and a planned Air Force strategic bomber program. It accelerated the development of solid fuel missiles technology. But the apparent success of the Navy in developing the Polaris system acted to spur the Air Force to develop its second generation system, the solid fuel Minuteman missile, thus continuing the rivalry between the two Services.
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs)
The case study on UAVs 5 provided the basis for a discussion of innovation trends over a long period (in this case, 40 years) under a variety of organizational structures and environments. Early UAV efforts in the Air Force were largely funded by the National Reconnaissance Office for strategic intelligence missions. Supporting development out of the intelligence budget offered the resources necessary to aggressively pursue innovative technologies, but did not serve to institutionalize strong support for UAVs within the Air Force. This was demonstrated when the responsibility for UAV development transitioned to the Air Force in the 1980s; the programs could not garner sufficient support, in competition with other Air Force missions, to thrive. There was also no significant competition over the mission area during this period to spur the development of alternative approaches to the problems encountered.
During the decade of the 1980s, a number of UAV development programs were initiated, but technical immaturity and lack of commitment prevented these programs from reaching fruition. The Congress, frustrated by apparent duplication, high program cost, and program failures, directed the implementation of a Joint Program Office for UAVs in 1988. UAV development was further centralized in 1993 with the creation, by the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and the Congress, of the Defense Airborne Reconnaissance Office (DARO). Although it did not achieve its intended goal, DARO could count as its signature success the RQ-1 Predator, before the organization was disbanded and control of UAVs returned to the Services in 1988. Since that time, OSD has maintained a "light" control over the Services' UAV programs, which had swelled to over 30 by 2009.
Although this case appears to demonstrate that consolidation of individual Service requirements into a joint program suppresses innovation, the real lesson may be more complicated than that. Enabling technologies, such as communications and navigation, were immature during the early UAV development period, and the mission environment during the Cold War period was much different than it is today. There is evidence that attempts to force disparate requirements into a common system resulted in solutions that, in the end, were ill-suited to all users' needs. But DARO was formed because of frustration over the Air Force's lack of enthusiasm for the airborne reconnaissance mission in general, and the development of UAVs in particular. Even though it did not achieve the envisioned success in developing final systems, it does appear to have been instrumental in developing those critical technologies that allowed the market to grow substantially after its demise. What is clear is that the centralization of control over the mission area prevented the development of strong institutional attachments in the Services for the systems under development, and the lack of parallel development of doctrine, strategies, and organizational structures that would provide long-term support for the solutions.
D. Discussion

Organizational Rivalries
Historically, the Royal Navy has dominated British military planning, while in China, the People's Liberation Army is paramount. The United States may be unique because it has no dominant military Service and, moreover, each of the Services has tactical aircraft units and both the Army and the Navy have ground forces. Each of the Services has a vision of its future within the military establishment. But the missions and functions inherent in these visions tend to overlap. This establishes the basis for rivalries among the Services and among elements within the Services, as they each seek to gain, or retain, those missions and functions that are critical to achieving their desired end states. The context in which the rivalry occurs influences the intensity of the rivalry. In cases of new missions (like strategic deterrence in the case of Polaris), the rivalry may be intense, as each Service seeks to gain a share of that new mission.
Innovation can be an organizational response to new strategic imperatives or to external threats. If, for example, the very existence of an organization is threatened, it may respond with disruptive innovation in order to preserve itself. Likewise, rivalrous situations threaten the organization's current or future missions and functions. The rivalry creates incentives for organizations, in concert with their industrial partners, to seek innovative solutions in order to convince senior decision-makers to assign, or preserve, the desired missions and functions.
Organizational rivalry among the Services changes the organizational dynamics between the Services and OSD. Only OSD is in a position to resolve rivalries among the Services, thus putting OSD in a position to pick winners and losers. To the extent that the Services can resolve differences among themselves, they avoid creating situations that demand OSD action. However, the innovative impact of rivalry may be short-circuited by these agreements among the Services to preserve the Services' mission space-for example, by cartelization through participation in joint programs.
Inter-Service rivalry appears to be less common today than it was during the Cold War period. This may be due to the fact that the pressure to make the right technology choices was more important during the Cold War, when technological superiority was considered essential. Today, however, one may consider training and preparedness to be more important tasks of the Military Services, and these functions are less likely to generate rivalrous behavior because they relate to how well one does an assigned mission, rather than what mission a Service should be assigned. The implementation of the Goldwater-Nichols Act in 1986 also appears to have reduced rivalry between the Services. The facts that there have not been many choices made over the last 20 years that had the potential to alter roles and missions, and that the Service budget shares have remained relatively constant over this period, provide some evidence for this view.
The Role of "Jointness"
The Congress and the DoD have aggressively pushed the concept of "jointness" in order to ensure that the Services can perform as an operationally effective team. But has the pressure for jointness tended to reduce the occasions for rivalry, and the attendant opportunities for material innovation? The answer to this question depends, in part, on how one defines "joint." One can look at jointness from an operational perspective, which involves the alignment of doctrine, tactics, and management in order to achieve a higher level of mission effectiveness. Although these "how we fight" decisions may impact material solutions, it is as a second-order effect.
Often, however, attempts are made to try to enforce jointness in the acquisition process, through mechanisms such as mandating the use of common systems developed by Joint Program Offices. It is also often argued that a common system will achieve cost savings. Possible savings must be weighed against the fact that the value of a common system must be measured by its effectiveness in the specific missions it was intended to accomplish; common systems may or may not be effective in all of the missions they were designed to achieve.
The Defense Integrated Military Human Resources System (DIMHRS) may be cited as an example of enforced jointness. OSD mandated a joint personnel management information technology system. Implementation required the harmonization of each of the Service's personnel pay systems. This harmonization failed, with the result that the integrated system was abandoned. During the period the joint program operated, however, no innovation was accomplished by the individual Services.
One cannot automatically presume that centralization and innovation cannot coexist. Military medicine has been centralized since the 1980s, yet revolutionary advances have been made in battlefield medicine. Unfortunately, there are no studies to help us determine the interplay of centralization and innovation.
There does not appear to be a clear relationship between common systems and the probability of program success or failure; not all failed programs are joint, and not all joint programs are failures. It may be useful to view the question of the success of joint programs along two separate dimensions: jointness vs. rivalry, and incremental change vs. radical change. In the recent past, the military has striven for transformational solutions, but these complex solutions often proved difficult to achieve. At this juncture, it is not clear how these two dimensions interact; for example, are individual solutions developed in a competitive environment more likely to be incremental changes, with a lower implementation risk?
In many cases, imposition of jointness relies on one Service's lack of enthusiasm for challenging another Service's programs and missions. As such it represents a form of collusion on the current assignment of those missions; if the collusion were eliminated, rivalry would reappear. But an often unrecognized cost of a decision to impose a common solution to satisfy a disparate set of requirements is the loss of innovation that can occur when multiple teams (military and industry) actively operate in a segment of the defense market.
Rivalry and the Industrial Base
Organizational rivalry impacts the defense industrial base by providing incentives for firms to develop innovative solutions to help their customer (the relevant Service or element of a Service) gain or retain a mission or function. This effect, however, is difficult to measure. Did the award of the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) to Lockheed Martin, for example, reduce or increase innovation in the industrial base? On one hand, jointness precluded competitive innovations from other potential firms on other fighter programs. On the other hand, the loss on the JSF program appears to have led Boeing to become innovative in the UAV market segment. It is not clear that there is a direct correlation, as defense firms tend to be responsive to their customers regardless of the competitive environment. And we do not know what innovation might have occurred if there had been several contract awards for individual systems.
The effect of organizational rivalry should vary with the condition of the industrial base. While the effect of rivalry on innovation may decrease as the number of sellers in the industrial base falls, economic theory suggests that the number of buyers is more important to spurring innovation than the number of sellers. This is true because the existence of multiple buyers provides greater rewards from product differentiation. This impact is strengthened in a world with few buyers-the addition of even one buyer presumably has a proportionately higher benefit.
Sales of military equipment to foreign customers may act to spur innovation, under appropriate conditions. Foreign customers do act as another buyer; however, foreign purchasers are often not looking to U.S. defense firms for the level of transformational innovation that Service rivalries can engender. They may be looking to buy the same capabilities currently in the U.S. inventory. Or they may be looking for platforms into which they can insert locally developed subsystems (such as the locally developed radar Israel installed on F-16 aircraft purchased from the United States). Finally, export control restrictions may act as a bar to the development and sale of innovative technology to foreign customers.
The Proper Role of OSD in Managing Organizational Rivalry
The Secretary of Defense and his staff should act as the judge to pick winners and losers in competitions for missions and functions. The competitors not only develop proposed solutions, but provide critiques of other proposed solutions in order to differentiate their proposals. But where in the process should such decisions be made? Some participants believed that competitions for missions and functions need to be made before system requirements are established, as the system is intended to fulfill the mission. For example, the Marine Corps' attachment to the V-22 aircraft owes much to its perception of the systems now required for a successful forcible entry from the sea. But the first decision should be whether the Marine Corps should be in that mission space. The second decision is the system decision-whether the V-22 is the appropriate system to support that mission.
However, the current OSD processes may not operate effectively at the mission and function level. Some believed that, as currently structured, these processes have little influence in the operational or the military requirements spheres of the defense establishment. The OSD staff does, however, have oversight responsibility for, and therefore influence on, the Services' organize, train, and equip functions. If this is the main lever of influence, then the OSD staff tends to over-supervise these functions. Yet attempting to impose a joint material solution on Service-unique requirements may result in a solution that sub-optimizes each of the Service requirements. Therefore, some participants argued, the most effective place to attempt to impose this type of jointness is at the mission and function level. Once OSD accepts a Service's interpretation of its future vision of its mission, it is difficult to argue over the material requirements that flow from that vision.
E. Conclusions
The general consensus of the participants is that organizational rivalry among the Military Services, and among elements within a Service, does encourage innovation in the defense industrial base. Although this effect may be reduced as the number of firms in the industrial base falls, the participants believe that the number of buyers has a greater effect on innovation than the number of sellers. The solutions produced through this process may not be the most cost-effective ones in the narrow sense (for example, on an individual system level), but the proper measure should be the overall cost of satisfying the mission requirement.
Most of the group concluded that an emphasis on jointness, as expressed in joint programs, has an ambiguous effect on the industrial base. Joint programs offer industry fewer opportunities to compete for contracts, and thereby fewer incentives to develop innovative solutions. Less opportunity in one particular market segment, however, may not be the proper metric, as it is feasible that innovative firms will turn their talents to opportunities in other market segments. Foreign markets may also offer opportunities to pursue competitive opportunities; whether these opportunities spur innovation depends upon the ability of the firm to offer unique military products, differentiated from those products develop for, and sold to, the DoD.
Finally, the group discussed whether the DoD today has the culture, a mandate, or the processes necessary to allow the Services to productively challenge one another for roles and missions. The Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) would appear to be an ideal vehicle to spur the appropriate competition, but recent QDRs have not done so. The Bottom-Up Review, conducted in 1993, may be the last time the Department attempted to facilitate a competition over roles and missions. Some believe that this is due, in part, to conscious efforts on the part of the Services, acting jointly, to avoid open rivalries and thereby create opportunities for OSD to pick winners and losers. Such efforts to suppress rivalry also suppress the incentives to invest in creative alternatives and the open debate about the strengths and weaknesses of those alternatives.
The lack of the structure and processes to allow such competitions may be traced to an imbalance in the regular OSD staff processes. As currently structured, these processes have little influence in the operational or military requirements spheres of the defense establishment. As the OSD staff does not currently operate effectively in the requirements process, enforcement of jointness tends to fall into the acquisition processes, a process the OSD staff has considerable influence over. But attempting to build joint programs from Service-unique (and DoD approved) requirements has proven ineffective in the past, often yielding systems that are sub-optimized for most uses and are unnecessarily complex. Organizational rivalry has been an important facet of the development of the American military establishment, but there are differing views on whether such rivalrous behavior has a positive or a negative effect on the achievement of the missions assigned to the Department of Defense. This paper reports on the results of a discussion, sponsored by IDA, on the impact of organizational rivalry on the defense industrial base, and in particular on the ability of that industrial base to develop innovative solutions to the Department's requirements. The discussion brought together academic researchers and senior IDA staffers who have significant experience in the development and execution of Department of Defense programs and policies. The participants concluded that organizational rivalry does contribute to the development of innovative solutions, but some believed that the Department's current processes act to suppress such rivalries, and thereby stifle the development of such solutions.
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